

Sun. AM

Rues

Now did "McN" get "criticism" of 25%
SU drafts?

Who wrote DPM?

Easton?

Smith-McHenry?

or?

> WWII!

Ask - Wf would SU accept loss of
Moscow? (158 wps?)

Amirgand?

Ans? to prompt US FS!

and why US FS?

GRA fines

- FIND JCS ops "looking into West Germany"

(Since end of CW: no ~~S~~ R allow for
when the "external det")

(Queerage!)

(or - since 1960? Not China!

see 1961, 64, 72!)

Qing: US intervention into S. Korean uprising!

→ US FU, from US FS.

(which we pose / enhance to
detonate SU/R total (or see) to US FU

8-3-9

Even if missile gap had existed -

1) The "real problem" would have still appeared to be, protecting Europe.

2) Detecting a surprise attack ^{on US} (see Pass + Fisher) is easy, not complicated;

is absence of
imminent fear of
US attack;

Rassmussen is
essential!

(lack of ABM
or CD does help)

To call it "national" is to ^{take} ~~miss~~ the intricacy of the real concept of "nat." to its extreme

- Destroy another pop., (^{would} ~~harm~~!)

- Risk total destruction of one's own

Consider "nat." of killing "work-force" to prevent recovery

(cf. attrition in ^{WWI} VN - "fighting birth-rate")


(I mean that some central NVN mobilization, recruits: revenge, "defense" of Motherland)

Just how could it make US refer, happen, to exterminate Russians (and ---) - ~~the~~ being destroyed SU Com Party cadres, Army


(Who but Coms could manage survival in SU?)

"No other prospect will deter the fear surprise attack"

Actually, only the prospect of prompt imminent attack could



To ensure US/NATO, SU had not only to
dismantle IRBMs (it did, with us)



7-6-9

Hyp: the late '58 response to a
NESEC study of US retal. to a SU
nuclear attack (killing every SU
city on 25,000...)

asked for ^(report on date of SU nuclear attack!) retal. efforts: mil or
opt. mix

But NSC 2009 study adds (!) criterion
of prevailing — not in the request.


Hyp: to deter SU nuclear attack, ^{prospects of} retal.
on mil. targets alone might not be deterrent
(though US power would be large!
Threat vs. SU cities would be vast!

What was the thinking? mil. targets
are enough for prevailing; prevailing!
enough

and more than enough power for deter!

But U-I not enough for prevailing, if
prevailing; + not enough, even with mil,
for prevailing gain (large) SU FS!

Which is enough power: opt. mix (mil + cities)? prevailing
or mil-only?



new 58
Petro was briefed on US intel. to a SU
surprise attack - and he said for intel mainly on U-I!
But real planning was for US FS
(SU wild targets)

intel. to prevent SU ability to measure
regional hitting U-I targets, mainly...

My concerns were seen, in 1959-60, & Navy,
Army, ^{US}MC - not combat, the
all but USAF + SAC (+ Training: USAF)
Haters?

e.g. China, Altis, Circs, full-art (grand bursts
MT)
~~low~~ former size ... FS = intel;

- Note also: Army / Navy know no SU ICBMs; yet...

like (Final Solution) WANNSEE Conf.

meeting on NSC 2009

UNDER WHAT

CIRCS

(Altis targets:
still secret
(1996)

logistics; target identification (plans)


By: Russian

not just "possible"

not just "intel possible"

not just "think of ..." (bluff) or "cap"

not just: for alt; for Type I alt; contingencies...



strange assumption (of Turing? USAF? SAC?)
of a single plan (+ target list) for
all circles of war!

present discussion is meetings + papers,
giving differences between "start,"
"warning" (FS),
injection (two warnings), actual, and
else (NATO, + ...)

assumption: destroying cities + control centers
will 2) destroy SU will to fight
(even on US FS)
and (b) ability to recover.

May now to assume we must know location
of SU weapons — despite U-2, satellites
(+ belief that SU had a few, in 1960-61.
(1959?))

May now consider, among, theoretical, appalled
of actual SIOB — now will getting to
stop it, change it (w. etc.)

Burke: Polaris was best for long ambition — except
for period of SU possession of a badly
moderated but unusable force: 1963-64...

the view declares that a "mil and" TS (target system)

Now and be that it aiming to hit
all SU cities.

(Centralization: which did NESC assume?
only SAC never decentral cities?)

so apt. mix was to
detonate

but also to prevail if det fails!

(2 conditions: { no warning
store warning
"street warning" / etc!
couldn't "prevail"

US destroyed

(if USAF acts correctly)

if not: easy to "prevail"

in FS (Pamphlet)

+ no need to "detonate"

USAF in: big powers: cannot (+)

CR together (only USAF)

"Prevail" forever, FS or not: destroy S-S base

AS IN 1958 etc!
(yes, "ambush" — along
with most or all else

STOP
~~Staff~~ did not "improve" on "appalling"

(to the) consequences of 1958 etc!

(Fewer SU cities, but...)



1959-61 / Min. task under all conditions!
(only!)
All agreed on need to hit cities under
all conditions of war.
(insane)

Any day: only cities!

Even war while also to target mil. (CBM),
esp. when retal (^{for} shot)

NEC: cities-only (might deter? but) wouldn't
prevail!

But issue: How many cities?

general burst?

multiple hits? MT?

As if det required ability to "prevail";

~~E~~ in FS?!

not feasible is retal!

can some mil. sup. after attack:

but if US sevent is destroyed?


"If det Type II Det fails

(SU attack on: Berlin!

West Europe!

then prevail, with FS!

But - why hit cities, then?!



7-09

DM: If US had both good ABM and cheap
caps: Couldn't there be an "automated"
Russian (delegated) system that would spend
ballast of our US — not SU —
ensuring ABM? (a "ship" offshore;
or, submersible warheads...)

Me vs. Butty Moscow

2 D.M.s — Schlieffen vs. Tsar

DM is plan, not demand/conviction: (WWI); C-II; ^{Delegation} NATO; SH'91; LOW
US LOW/LUA system (Blair)

Dogmas believ. "Ily must have taken care of
this."

Not only note DM deliberate screw; but opponents'
intelligence failures; and failures to "learn,"
to adjust plans (for cheap — see 1991/2003!)

*

[WHAT IF: A fraction in a civil war in
Russia, Pakistan, India, China, (France 1960!)

(Fundamentalist or terrorist crew in US, UK, France,

(or if North Korea) gain control of a missile complex

(see SU in Cuban Title) and threatens a Sanctuary Option


"unless..." OR does it (Mazda; US spy in Moscow?!

— Shuts US, or SU, or both (Late African Israel ⁵⁴

AS IN: Memo that Rumsfeld; (TV film, on "me"); "Seven Days to..."

South Africa,
Israel
(France?)
(North Korea)

(AUM SHINREYO
Movement that
Rumsfeld
TO GET DEARM-
AMENT



2-28-09

conf with
FAS/NRDC

to Salin:

do fine taken into
account in calculating
effects of SIR/R
retal. as US?!!

or on NATO
Europe?!

or in LNO's?!

or CF attacks?
(the POSSON MODEL)

Back in Progress

The men running on
politics now are
not really different
(worse) than the
ones who created
SIOB-62 or 63
(me)

see Blair of Ed

N4T 10-8-93



7-18-09

The process of
Revolving SPOD-62
manual free-
delusional Review
to the income and
and conclusions.

TR

~~A~~

A. chapter ~~as~~ month
"a book a month"

Aug 6 - ~~Bomb~~ bomb

get
Fate of the Earth

~~FAS Report?~~

\$-4-09

Targeting of news
by NWS

will not only
affect
the advertisers!

("Distress")

Recovery / Restoration
(U-I fighting would
cause me with
AKO fallout!)

as, my thanks, via
note.

BUT WE ARE ALL HOSTAGES
(esp. ourselves; & globe)

8-4-09

Yes, we are all
"stakeholders"

UN: NNWS have
a responsibility
to the ~~our~~ people

and to knowing, global

to demand if knowledge
of new plans

2) control / constraint
of the

3) knowledge + influence

our: warning systems,
PACs, control; threats...

8-8-09

NOC WINTER

Wanted Reunion

FS (on ritual)

could have written?

Do they know?

Shouldn't we + could
know?

Amali?

(Frank / UK Targeting?)

(D.M. — like

Deal Hand of)


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
FV H

HOLDREN!


(Environmental Agencies
& LIVEOS)


Millions TS
~~MSB~~





Millions
~~at 500~~





Millions
~~MSB~~ TS - EO

